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635 
A BRIEF ESSAY ON THE IMPORTANCE OF TIME IN 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 1 
Vincenzo Vinciguerra* 
Time has an unusual limitation. It must begin and end at some real 
points or it must be conceived of as cyclical in nature, endlessly 
allowing the repetition of patterns of possibilities.2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This essay will briefly address the issue of time in some 
fundamental international conventions on Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPRs). Primarily, this article concentrates on four current international 
conventions and discusses the importance and international relevance of 
the time factor in each convention. 
The first part introduces two characteristic ideas of time inherited 
from philosophical thought.3 It also describes how “linearity,” one 
characteristic time can assume, might be a way to think of the legal 
system.4 This article does not delve into philosophical aspects of this 
issue; they are merely a cue to analyze the issue of time in the context of 
intellectual property. 
The second part details some of the more important international 
 
1 I give heartfelt thanks to  Prof. Achille de Nitto, to whom I owe, among countless other precepts, 
all the ideas behind this essay. My deepest thanks go also to Prof. Thomas Cotter - in whom I found 
a priceless guidance - for his precious insights to this article. 
* J.D, University of Pisa, Italy. Ph.D. candidate of ISUFI (Institute for Advanced Interdisciplinary 
Studies), University of Lecce, Italy. Visitor scholar at Fredric G. Levin College of Law, Gainesville, 
Florida, U.S.A., fall semester, 2004. 
 2. ROBERT ALLEN WARRIOR, TRIBAL SECRETS, RECOVERING AMERICAN INDIAN 
INTELLECTUAL TRADITION 72 (University of Minnesota Press 2001) (1995) (quoting Vine Deloria, 
Jr. Yankton Sioux, inscription at the entrance of the “Pearsall Collection of American Indian Art,” 
Florida Museum of Natural History, Gainesville, Florida (last visited October 2004)). 
 3. See infra notes 6-15 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra notes 16-32 and accompanying text. 
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conventions on IPRs regarding the relevant time-related aspects. Other 
aspects and details of these conventions are left to the existing 
literature.5  
The third, and final, section asks if time, as implemented in the IPR 
conventions, might be construed as circular rather than as a 
unidirectional straight line..6  It suggests that time, in any form carved 
out by these conventions, is a fundamental part of IPRs and not merely 
an ancillary element. All IPRs are deeply embedded in the time factor.  
Because an inventor’s rights and the concept of time are so interrelated,  
underestimating time’s role may results in the abridgement of the 
inventor’s rights.  
II.  TIME AND LAW  
A.  Lightness and Heaviness of Time 
The concept of time always has been central in human thought, and 
different ideas and conceptions of time have been developed in the fields 
of philosophy, science and literature. For example, in the philosophical 
field, time has been considered a gauge of movement: “Time is the 
numeration of continuous movement”7 according to what comes before 
and to what comes later.8 On the other hand, St. Augustine described 
time as being “distensio animi,” which means the internal flow of the 
conscience.9  In literature, M. Proust viewed time, in the wake of the 
French Philosopher H. Bergson, as an internal experience that can be 
grasped only by intuitive memory. In science, the concept of time is 
dominated by the contra position between Newton’s theory of Universal 
Time and Einstein’s Theory of Relativity.10 
It is common to employ metaphors, such as “linearity” and 
“circularity,” to describe time.  Time can be thought of as running ahead 
in a straight line, or time can be conceived as a bent line that turns in a 
 
 5. See infra notes 50-93. 
 6. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. 
 7. See Aristotle, PHYSICS, BOOK 4 223b:1 (Robin Waterfield trans., Oxford University Press 
1996). See generally Aristotle’s Spacetime, available at http://www.phy.syr.edu/courses/modules 
/LIGHTCONE/aristotle.html (last visited May 14, 2006). 
 8. See SERGIO PERONCINI, “La Formula ‘ora per allora’ nel Diritto Pubblico: le diverse 
tipologie di provvedimenti ‘ora per allora’” [‘Nunc pro tunc’ Doctrine in Public Law I: Different 
Kind of ‘Nunc pro tunc’ Judgements] Collana problemi attuali di diritto Amministrativo, 11 Ed. 
Scientifiche Italiane, 1995. 
 9. Id. at 11. 
 10. Id. at 11-12. 
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circle. 
Milan Kundera referred to this dichotomy using the metaphors of 
lightness and heaviness.11 Circular time is heavy because if 
every second of our lives recurs an infinite number of times, we are 
nailed to eternity as Jesus Christ was nailed to the cross. It is a 
terrifying prospect. In the world of eternal return the weight of 
unbearable responsibility lies heavy on every move we make. That is 
why Nietzsche called the idea of eternal return the heaviest of 
burdens.12 
 Every action a person takes is destined to recur endlessly, and since 
the event repeats inexorably, the moment in which a choice must be 
made bears a “heavy” responsibility.   
 Alternatively, time may be thought to run ahead in a straight line, 
without looping onto itself. 
Putting it negatively, the myth of eternal return states that a life which 
disappears once and for all, which does not return, is like a shadow, 
without weight, dead in advance, and whether it was horrible, 
beautiful, or sublime, its horror, sublimity, and beauty mean nothing. 
We need take no more note of it than of a war between two African 
kingdoms in the fourteenth century, a war that altered nothing in the 
destiny of the world, even if a hundred thousand blacks perished in 
excruciating torment.13 
This means that, as in the above quote, since the stupidity of a war 
will not be repeated, it can be conscientiously forgiven and forgotten. It 
is never going to happen again.14 
“[I]s heaviness truly deplorable and lightness splendid?”15 
Giansanti continues that “the only certainty is the lightness/weight 
opposition is the most mysterious, most ambiguous of all.”16 
B.  The System of Law and Its Time 
Is it possible to apply the metaphor of the opposition 
 
 11. See Andrea Giansanti, Tempo Leggero / Tempo Pesante. Tempo dell’economia, tempo 
della fisica: irreversibilità, omogeneizzazione, Feb. 11, 2003, unpublished hand out for ISUFI’s 
PhD classes. 
 12. See MILAN KUNDERA, THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF BEING 5 (Michael Henry Heim 
trans., Perennial Classic ed. 1984). 
 13. Id. at 3. 
 14. See Giansanti, supra note 11, at 2. 
 15. Id. at 5. 
 16. Id. at 6. 
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lightness/heaviness to the legal system?17 If so, is the legal system itself 
linear or nonlinear and how does it deal with time?18 
A system of law is a possible group and arrangement consisting of 
bodies of law, rules and prescriptions.19 The “system of law” is an ideal, 
rational, and ordered group of laws.20 Of course, one may envisage 
different orders for each different system of law. 
One possible order of a system of law is a linear conception.21  The 
basic idea is to conceive the law as a science in the same manner that 
Physics is deemed to be a natural science. To accomplish this goal, the 
legal system is (thought of and) arranged more geometrico – a complete, 
ordered system, within a taxonomic order.22 According to Professor 
Langdell, Dean of Harvard University Law School at the end of the 
nineteenth century, “it is indispensable to establish at least two things: 
first, the law is a science. Secondly, that all the available materials of 
that science are contained in the printed books.” 23 In others words, law 
is “a complete, formal, and conceptually ordered system that satisfies the 
legal norms of objectivity and consistency.”24 This same idea underpins 
all the civil law codes (which have their roots in the French illuministic 
civil code); these codes claim completeness and no flaws, gaps or 
lacunas whatsoever. All the answers to every practical problem and 
cases are, as Professor Langdell would say, in the civil code. 
One way to think about a nonlinear order may be through this 
metaphor employed by the economist Fredrick von Hayek.25 A contra 
position exists between the systems von Hayek calls “Taxis” and the 
 
 17. See ACHILLE DE NITTO, DIRITTO DEI GIUDICI E DIRITTO DEI LEEGISLATORI 127 (Argo 
2002). 
 18. See  Achille de Nitto, address at a PhD class held at ISUFI, Lecce, Italy (Mar. 11, 2003). 
See also LORENZO CARNELLI, Tempo e Direito [TIME AND LAW], (Erico Maciel trans., José 
Konfino ed., 1960). 
 19. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 914 (8th ed. 2004) (defining legal order). 
 20. See, e.g., Norberto Bobbio, Il Positivismo Giuridico; Lezioni di Filosofia del Diritto 
Raccolte dal Dott. Nello Morra 153 (Giappichelli, ed. 1979). 
 21. See DE NITTO, supra note 17, at 132-37 (“il comando si presume chiaro, ed il flusso 
prescrittivo ininterrotto, rapido e, soprattutto, lineare”). 
 22. See CH. PERELMAN, L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON 
ARGUMENTATION 1-2 (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1958) 
(1969) (“Reasoning more geometrico was the model proposed to philosophers desirous of 
constructing a system of thought which might attain to the dignity of a science.”). 
 23. See GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT 
CENTURY’S END 13 (N.Y. Univ. Press 1995), for an accurate account of the main American 
jurisprudential school in the twentieth century. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See de Nitto, supra note 18, at 130. 
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ones he calls “Cosmos.”26 The former is a system with a specific aim; all 
the components of the system are coordinated to contribute to that aim. 
Conversely, the latter is a spontaneous order, a “humoured” system.27 It 
is not a system geometrically or rigidly regimented by strict rules with 
specific aims.28 It is an order in which – because of its nature – non 
rational elements find a proper arrangement therein, such as the trust of 
the market29 and the goodwill of businesses. 
The idea of a reasonable system, as opposed to a rational system30 
has been sustained by other schools of thoughts, in both Europe and in 
the United States. For example, the American Realist Movement in the 
1920’s and 1930’s31 strongly opposed the formalist conception of law.  
More recently, the Legal Feminist Movement, among others, proposed a 
contextual and subjective approach for construing law.32 
In sum, it seems that the contra position formal versus non-formal 
system of law (linear/non-linear) has always been important33 and it 
continues to remain relevant.34 
C.  Law and Metaphors 
Apart from the contraposition of thoughts within all the possible 
variations,35 the idea of a linear, straightforward system has been 
“absorbed” and implemented in the language of law, the legal jargon.36  
If one looks at the legal words used everyday, they might find that these 
words express purposes of perfection, and taxonomic order previously 
mentioned, as part of an ancient legal tradition. 
 
 26. See F. A. VON HAYEK, LEGGE, LEGISLAZIONE E LIBERTÀ [LAW, LEGISLATION AND 
LIBERTY] (Il Saggiatore ed., Routledge & Kegan Paul trans., London 1973-1979) (1986).  For the 
English version, see F.A. VON HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 35-41 (University of 
Chicago Press 1973). 
 27. See DE NITTO, supra note 17, at 130.  See VON HAYEK, supra note 26 (According to Von 
Hayek spontaneous orders, such as a legal order as well as an economic system, can only be 
generated and efficiently run by “abstract norms” of interaction among the “aimed systems”). 
 28. See DE NITTO, supra note 17, at 130 (the author distinguishes between a “rational” 
positive order as opposed to a “reasonable” positive order). 
 29. Id. at 141. 
 30. Id. at 130. 
 31. See MINDA, supra note 23, at 25. 
 32. Id. at 132. 
 33. See Michael Steven Green, Hans Kelsen and the Logic of Legal Systems, 54 ALA. L. REV. 
365 (2003) (testifying to the topicality of the problem). 
 34. It is interesting that in the same period of time as the Legal Realist Movement, Hans 
Kelsen wrote his “Reine Rechtslehr,” one of the powerful theories upholding a “tough” legal 
formalism. 
 35. See generally MINDA, supra note 23. 
 36. See DE NITTO, supra note 18, at 127. 
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• The word right, as used in the law schools and courts, means “a 
legal entitlement to have or obtain something or to act in a 
certain way.”37 However, right also means “conformity with 
justice or morality.”38  Right is defined as “in accordance with 
fact, reason, or true, correct” and “in a straight line; directly.”39 
 
• The word rule, as used in law schools, means “an authoritative 
direction for conduct or procedure”40 (eventually given by law). 
However, it also means “a statement that describes what is true 
in most or all cases.”41 
 
• Ruler not only means “one that rules or governs” (presumably 
by making laws and bestowing rights), but also a “straightened 
strip for drawing straight lines and measuring lengths.”42 
 
• Standard is used in legal jargon to mean “a level of quality or 
attainment” and “an idea of thing used as a measure, norm or 
model. . . .”43 However, standard also means “a principle of 
conduct informed by notions of honour and decency” or “an 
object that is supported in an upright way.”44 
 
These lemmas are used in the legal jargon as metaphors. Metaphor 
in Greek means “to transport, or “to convey.”45 The meaning that right 
(in the legal sense) conveys is given by the other meaning referred to 
above: conformity with justice, true, correct.  Right sustained by the 
State power is a “rule,” “edge,” something that neatly divides the right 
from the awry, the right from the wrong.46 
Interestingly, the same use of the word right as a metaphor can be 
found in the French word “droit,” the Spanish word “derecho,”47 the 
 
 37. THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1467 (Oxford Univ. Press  2001). 
 38. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 719 (Dell Publ’g 2001). 
 39. Id. (emphasis added). 
 40. Id. at 728. 
 41. Id. (emphasis added). 
 42. Id. (emphasis added). 
 43. THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1660 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001). 
 44. Id. (emphasis added) 
 45. See William Crightor, NEW GREEK-ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Zeno 1966) (definiting 
“metaphor”).  
 46. See Federico Spantigati, “Analisi del diritto dell’economia” [Analysis of the Economic 
Law] 3 (forthcoming). 
 47. Interesting, in Spanish the word “derecho” means both “straight” and, with a slight 
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German word “reicht” and the Italian word “diritto.”48 It is not a 
coincidence. All the terms share the same idea of linearity, and all of 
them share the metaphorical meaning carried by the original Latin word 
directum.49 
Thus, “right” is the opposite of wrong, false, bent, askew, awry. 
Using a mathematical metaphor, a straight line is the shortest way to link 
two points on a plane, the rule of law is thought to solve a practical case 
in the easiest and most straightforward way.50 This would be possible so 
long as the legal order is construed as a systematic, flawless order. Given 
a hypothetical case in point and knowing the rule to apply, one and only 
one answer will be possible. Accordingly, time must also be thought to 
be as linear as the legal system itself. Such an ordered and coherent 
system leaves no room for other interferences. Therefore, time in the 
legal system is thought of as an irreversible flow from the past to the 
present and from the present to the future, a unidirectional temporal 
sequence that cannot return.51 
III.  TIME IN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 
A.  The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
The Paris convention of March 20, 1883 came into effect on July 7, 
1884. Since then, it has been revised many times, most recently at 
Stockholm in 1967.52 As its title suggests, the purpose of the convention 
was to formulate principles to accord protection of Industrial Property.53 
A major achievement of the convention was the establishment of an 
 
correction, “right” (derecha).  See THE OXFORD-DUDEN PICTORIAL SPANISH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 
508 (Oxford University Press, 1985). 
 48. See DE NITTO, supra note 18, at 137 (quoting W.Cesarini Sforza, Principio e Concetto, 
Enciclopedia del diritto, 630 ss., Milano 1964). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 138. 
 51. See Francesco La Valle, Nss. Dig. It., successione, 635, 1971. 
 52. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 
1583 (as revised on July 14, 1967 in Stockholm) [hereinafter Paris Convention].  See, e.g., George 
Hendrick Christian Bodenhausen, Guide to the Application of the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property, as revised at Stockholm in 1967, UNITED INTERNATIONAL 
BUREAUX FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1968). 
 53. See Paris Convention, supra note 52, art. 1(2).  “Industrial Property” is a label that 
encompasses some legal institutions: patent, utility model, industrial design, trademarks, service 
marks, trade names, indication of source or appellation of origin. Since the patent may be 
considered the archetype of industrial property I will employ it as the main example in examining 
all the international conventions regarding industrial property. 
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international priority system for the registration of industrial property.54 
Before the Paris convention was implemented, finding patent protection 
outside the boundaries of the country in which the patent was first filed 
was almost impossible. In fact, it was very difficult and expensive to 
apply for a patent in two or more different countries at the same time. 
Moreover, failure to file a patent simultaneously in all the countries 
where protection was sought could (and often did) deprive the invention 
of its required novelty55 in countries other than the one in which the 
initial application was made.56 
The Paris Convention solved this problem by establishing the “right 
of priority:” “Any person who has duly filed an application for a patent 
. . . in one of the countries of the union . . . shall enjoy, for the purpose of 
filing in the other countries, a right of priority during the periods 
hereinafter fixed.”57 As a consequence, 
any subsequent filing in any of the other countries of the Union before 
the expiration of the periods referred to above shall not be invalidated 
by reason of any acts accomplished in the interval, in particular, 
another filing, the publication or exploitation of the invention, the 
putting on sale of copies of the design . . . .58 
These provisions mean that, for example, if X applies for a patent in 
country (A), she will retain, for one year, her right to apply for a patent 
on the same invention in all the other countries of the Union, despite 
what might happen after the first date of application in country (A), such 
as the publication or the exploitation of the work. This means that all the 
activities that would normally defeat the novelty of the invention, in the 
absence of any agreements, are irrelevant. 
The filing of the first application, the one that triggers the process, 
establishes the date of  filing. The effect of the application is retained 
“whatever may be the subsequent fate of the application.”59 This means 
 
 54. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (Harvard Univ. Press 1975). 
 55. “Novelty” is, along with “utility” and “non-obviousness,” one of requirements for 
patentability.  See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY, THOMAS M. JORDE, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 112 (Aspen Publishers 2003).  “The 
novelty test determines whether the claimed invention is unpatentable because it was made before, 
sold before . . . or otherwise disqualified by prior use or knowledge.” Id. 
 56. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 333 (Foundation 
Press 2001). 
 57. See Paris Convention, supra note 52, art. 4 (a, 1), (emphasis added) (the period of priority 
is fixed, for the patent, at twelve months). 
 58. Id. at art. 4 (b) (emphasis added). 
 59. Id. at art. 4(a)3. 
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that when a new application is completed in a different country within 
the Union, it is treated as if it had been filed on the date the first 
application was filed, even if the original application had been 
withdrawn or cancelled. 
Is this an example of circular time or, instead, is a fictio juris being 
implemented here?60  A fictio juris is an assumption that considers as 
true something that cannot be true.61 Is it here implemented to assure 
coherency to the linear idea of time? Or is it the idea of linearity that 
forces us to think in term of fictiones? 
B.  Patent Cooperation Treaty 
In the mid 1960’s, improving and strengthening the international 
patent system was one of the goals of President Johnson’s 
administration.  President Johnson appointed a special commission to 
study the United States’s patent system and the commission came up 
with the recommendation that, inter alia, “the United States [should] 
promote direct interim steps toward the ultimate goal: a universal patent 
including harmonization of patent practices.”62 That was the starting 
point that led to the diplomatic conference in June of 1970 where the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) came to light.63 Once again, the time 
factor plays a fundamental role.64 
In Professor Paul Goldstein’s words: “The most significant 
advantage [of the PCT] is the additional time provided before a final 
decision has to be made on the filing of individual application in 
different countries.”65 Hence, there is here no particular or original 
application of a time factor; however, time remains one of the most 
 
 60. See La Valle, supra note 51, at 637 (quoting K. Helwig and  S. Pugliatti). 
 61. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 657 (8th ed. 2004). 
 62. Interestingly, but not surprisingly, the same interest has prevailed in the international 
arena leading, years later, to the worldwide harmonization of IPRs through the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), available at http://www.wto.org/english/ 
docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#TRIPs (last visited May 14, 2006).  See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 56, at 
353. 
 63. See Patent Cooperation Treaty, with Regulations, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645 
[hereinafter PCT]. 
 64. The PCT sets forth in art. 4 that the applicant, beyond the year provided for by the Paris 
Convention, has bestowed with eight additional months (plus a preliminary search report) upon 
which grounding the decision on whether or not complete the filing in the designated countries.  
Because art. 27(7) and rule 4(7) do not compel to appoint a national attorney or agent until 
processing of the international application has started in the designate national patent office, the 
monetary savings is huge.  A lot has been written about the PCT.  See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 
56, at 353. 
 65. Id. at 356 (emphasis added). 
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important features “manipulated” in the treaty, which acknowledges that 
time is a key element greatly affecting the holder’s interest. 
C.  The “Madrid Agreement” and “Madrid Protocol” 
The purpose of the “Madrid Agreement Concerning the 
International Registration of Marks” (Madrid Agreement)66 is to 
simplify the international registration process of Trade Marks (TM).67  
This pact enables a trademark owner, in any of the contracting countries, 
to secure trademark protection by filing “an application for international 
registration”68 in the original country’s trademark court.69 The 
international application is received by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO)70 which issues an international registration and 
transmits it to the designated countries for examination.71 
The United States did not adhere to the Madrid Agreement72 
partially because of the “central attack” provision, which provides that if 
the home country registration is cancelled (or otherwise invalidated), 
registrations in all designated foreign countries will fall with it.73 
The Protocol relating to the Madrid Agreement (Madrid Protocol),74 
adopted in 1989, has modified the most objectionable features of the 
original agreement. The protocol now allows a TM owner, whose 
registration has been cancelled in the country of origin, to retain her 
international application and, thus, to file a registration application in the 
designated countries, as if it had been filed on the date of the 
international registration. 
As in the Paris Convention, the question becomes whether a fictio 
 
 66. See Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, April 14, 
1891, (as revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967), available at http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/legal_ 
texts/trtdocs_wo015.html [hereinafter Madrid Agreement] (last visited May 14, 2006). 
 67. The term Trade Mark includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof, the producers use to identify and distinguish her goods, including a unique product, from 
those manufactured or sold by other and to indicate the source of the goods. For a definition of 
“service mark” the definition of TM must be applied, mutatis mutandis, to a service. See MERGES, 
MENELL, LEMLEY, JORDE, supra note 55, at 537. 
68.  See Madrid Agreement, supra note 66, art 1(2).  
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.  To be sure, the application is received by the International Bureau of Intellectual 
Property. 
 71. Id. art. 3(4). 
 72. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 56, at 471. 
 73. See Madrid Agreement, supra note 66, art. 6 (3). 
 74. See Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration 
of Marks, June 28, 1989, available at http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/legal_texts/trtdocs_wo016. 
Html (last visited May 14, 2006). 
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juris is employed, or is it an example of circular time? 
D.  The Nunc Pro Tunc and Relation Back Doctrines 
Both in the Paris Convention and in the Madrid Protocol, 
something that had ceased to exist (the first application or the 
international registration, respectively)75 is a point of reference for the 
new application in the designated countries. Both the Paris Convention 
and the Madrid Protocol use a no-longer-existent act as a point of 
reference for the validity of a subsequent act.76 
A different process happens with the nunc pro tunc and the relation 
back doctrine. The nunc pro tunc judgment means “a procedural device 
by which the record of a judgment is amended to accord with what the 
judge actually said and did, so that the record will be accurate.”77 
Something similar happens with the doctrine of relation back. “[A]n act 
done at a later time is, under certain circumstances, treated as though it 
occurred at an earlier time. In federal civil procedure, an amended 
pleading may relate back, for purposes of the statute of limitations, to the 
time when the original pleading was filed.”78  These two doctrines are 
employed only if there is a mistake in a pre-existent document and this 
document is still legally existent. 
According to these two doctrines, those past events, through a fictio 
juris, are considered as if they were effective and qualified in the way 
the present judgment does. Therefore, the problem of the effect of a past 
act is surmounted, again, by a mental construction. However, a 
characteristic of the nunc pro tunc judgment seems to be that it “applies 
only when there is a past legal fact to which to apply the present 
judgment.”79 It seems that it is impossible to produce this result out of 
 
 75. See id. at art. 9 quinquies (first sentence). 
 76. But see PERONCINI, supra note 8, at 144 ff. 
 77. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1100 (8th ed. 2004).  See also 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 123 
(2005) (the purpose of the ‘nunc pro tunc’ judgement is “to alter a judgment actually rendered, or to 
correct an erroneous decision or judgment; and, generally speaking, the object or office of the entry 
is only to supply matters of evidence or to correct clerical misprisions, and not to supply omitted 
judicial action”). 
 78. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c).  Even though it’s possible the first document was void, I would 
argue that it would be partially void, only in regard of the mistake that the doctrine wants to correct.  
In the Paris convention, on the contrary, the application is considered totally void.  For an 
explanation of the rule, see Steven S. Sparling, Relation Back of ‘John Doe’ Complaints in Federal 
Court: What you don’t Know can Hurt You, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1235 (1997).  Even though it’s 
possible the first document was void, I would argue that it would be partially void, only in regard of 
the mistake that the doctrine wants to correct. In the Paris convention, on the contrary, the 
application is considered totally void. 
 79. The nunc pro tunc doctrine permits courts to enter orders having retroactive effect for the 
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thin air, without the existence of previous fact,80 a nunc pro tunc 
judgment. The same conclusion is reached regarding the relation back 
doctrine. 
By way of contrast, pursuant to Article 9 quinquies of Madrid 
Protocol (and, mutatis mutandis, pursuant article 4 of Paris Convention) 
there are no past legal events, because they have been cancelled, that 
refer to the new effect. Thinking about it in terms of fictiones, perhaps a 
“stronger” one is implemented here.81 
Again, is it possible to think of these provisions as inverting the 
flow of time? Maybe it is just a fascination, such as the fictio juris, and it 
is possible to qualify these events, as hypothetical fact situations – with 
facts proceeding in a progressive order – to which the rule attaches legal 
consequences.82 In this event, another “tool” is employed to adapt the 
system to the idea of linearity. As usual, it is a matter of the premises 
chosen and the goals set.83 
E.  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
and its Application 
The time factor also plays a fundamental role in the conventions 
protecting literary and artistic works. 
The Berne Convention was the first agreement protecting literary 
and artistic works.  Signed in Berne, Switzerland, on September 9, 1886, 
the Convention has often been revised, most recently in the 1979.84 
The Berne Convention protects “every production in the literary, 
scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its 
 
limited purpose of correcting a previously entered order which contained an error, omission, or a 
mistake. See Gagnon v. United States, 193 U.S. 451 (1904); Brignardello v. Gray, 68 U.S. 627 
(1864).  See also Matthias v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 341 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1965).  The Supreme Court of 
Nebraska held that “proper function of a nunc pro tunc order is not to correct some affirmative 
action which court ought to have taken but is to correct the record which has been made, so that it 
will truly record action which was really had but which through some inadvertence or mistake has 
not been truly recorded.”  Andrews v. Neb. State Ry. Comm’n, 121 N.W.2d 32, (Neb. 1963) 
(emphasis added). 
 80. But see PERONCINI, supra note 8, at 144 ff. 
 81. In fact, this provision pegs the new effect not to the past event (the original application no 
longer existing) but to a certain point in the past (that only corresponds with the time period of the 
old application). 
 82. This means that all of the elements that must be met in order to trigger legal protection are 
straight in the time, one after the other progressively.  See DIZIONARIO GIURIDICO Francesco 
De Franchis, fattispecie. 
 83. See DE NITTO, supra note 18, at 142. 
 84. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, September 9, 
1886 (as amended September 28, 1979), available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trt 
docs_wo001.html [hereinafter Berne Convention] (last visited May 14, 2006). 
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expression, such as books, pamphlet and other writing. . . .”85 The Berne 
Convention (as developed over time) vests the authors with an array of 
substantial rights such as the national treatment, the right of translation, 
reproduction, certain moral rights, etc.86 Moreover, the convention sets 
forth the minimum period of protection for artistic and literary works.87 
Generally, a country does not have any obligations, absent 
international agreements, to protect a work by a foreign national or a 
work first published in another country.88  The protection consists in 
recognizing to the author of an artistic or literary work a bundle of rights 
that expands its effects over a certain span of time.  No protection is 
granted if the terms of protection will not be recognized in the country 
where protection is sought. Here, the Berne Convention steps in. 
According to Article 18, the Convention shall apply to the works of 
authorship that have not yet fallen into the public domain at the time of 
its enactment. Conversely, no protection is granted to works that have 
fallen into the public domain in the country where protection is claimed, 
even though the work is still protected in the country of origin.89 
This provision is important, despite being the source of many 
problems. 90  One can facilitate an understanding of this provision and 
the time factor in the copyright arena by referring to a judicial case.  
This case was heard before the German Federal Supreme Court in the 
1978.91 The issue was whether, within the legal framework given by the 
interference of the Berne Convention along with other international 
 
 85. Id. at art. 2(1). 
 86. Id. at art. 5, art. 8, art. 9, art. 6bis. 
 87. In fact, copyright protection is limited in time.  Id. at art. 7. 
 88. But see the French and German systems of law where, because of the philosophical 
premises underpinning IPRs, protection for at least some “moral rights” are unconditionally and 
universally extended.  See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 56. 
 89. See Berne Convention, supra note 84, art. 18(1-2) (“This Convention shall apply to all 
works which, at the moment of its coming into force, have not yet fallen into the public domain in 
the country of origin through the expiry of the term of protection . . .  If, however, through the 
expiry of the term of protection which was previously granted, a work has fallen into the public 
domain of the country where protection is claimed, that work shall not be protected anew”). 
 90. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 56, at 193 (pointing out that the retroactive protection is 
accorded by the convention to foreign works existent at the time the convention came into effect 
between the protecting country and the work’s country of origin so long as the requirements set 
forth by Art. 18 are met).  It is also worthwhile to mention the “Copyright in Restored Works,” 
pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 104A, which solves the problem of the protection of foreign works, when 
the Berne Convention entered into force in the United States in 1989, that had lost their United 
States copyrights because the copyright owner had failed to comply with renewal formalities. 
 91. Atlas Film & AV GmbH & Co. Verleih u. Vertrieb v. Janus Film u. Fernesehen 
Vertriebgesellschaft mbh. Case n. I ZR 97/76, 10 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL 
PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT LAW 358 (1979). 
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agreements,92  the petitioner’s work still had copyright protection in 
Germany.93  The German Supreme Court, holding in favour of the 
petitioner, recognized the significance of the term of protection in the 
copyright law as a critical issue.94 The Court held that “the term of 
protection [constitutes] a right in a work”95 and that the term of 
protection is not “merely a durational limitation of a right.”96 
According to the Court, the substantial right conferred by the 
copyright would be deeply “affected” if the period of protection is 
miscounted and underestimated in its scope and duration.97 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Both the Paris Convention and the Madrid Protocol employ a fictio 
juris.  The question remains whether a fictio is merely an “intellectual 
tool” used to explain something otherwise not explainable, an 
escamotage that must be used in order to reckon with the idea of linear 
time because time in the legal system usually defines time as an 
irreversible flow of time, from the past to the present and vice versa, or 
as a unidirectional temporal sequence.98 
Notwithstanding the suggestive imagery of the linear/circular time, 
and in light of the aforementioned provisions as well as the decision of 
the German Supreme Court, the time-factor is a fundamental element of 
intellectual property rights. The matter at hand is substantial. The time 
factor does not concern how long the time of protection ought to be. The 
time factor (whatever the length) underpins the interest of the IPRs 
holder, and it shapes the scope of protection given by law. Since the 
particular interest of the rights holder is the starting point for the process 
that leads to the creation of the rule of law,99 the time factor is the 
essence of the “intellectual bundle of rights.” 
 
 92. Id.; see also Universal Copyright Convention, Paris text, 1971, art XIX, available at 
http://www.cni.org/docs/ infopols/ US.Universal.Copyright.Conv.html (last visited May 14, 2006). 
 93. For a detailed comment on this case, see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 56, at 188. 
 94. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 56, at 188. 
 95. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 56, at 191. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See La Valle, supra note 51, at 635. 
 99. Bigliazzi Geri, Breccia, Busnelli, Natoli, I, 1, “Diritto Civile” [Civil Law] 288 (Utet ed. 
1986). 
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